The Development of Ballistic Missiles in the United States Air Force, 1945-1960

Release Date:- 1990-01-01

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His O ES Jacob Neufeld OFFICE OF AIR FORCE HISTORY UNITED STATES AIR FORCE WASHINGTON, D.C., 1990 Jet Missiles Developed During World War II Test flight of the JB-2, an American copy of the German V-I. A static test firing of the JB-2 guided missile at Eglin Field, Florida, November 1944. 14 As an alternative to the JB-2, the AAF developed a "flying wing" missile-the JB-l. The JB-I0, an improved version of the JB-l, being prepared for a test night at Eglin AFB. 15 The JB-3, among the most promising missiles at the end of World War II. Lt. Gen. Barney M. Giles, Chief of the Air Staff, AAF, advocated mass production of the JB-2. 16 BALLISTIC MISSILES of the nation, had to be prepared to repel all attacks-Iand, sea, and air. Hence, the AAF should have unlimited freedom to obtain any type of weapon, whether aerodynamically sustained or self-propelled in flight.24 Norstad's statement came before the General Staff and, in February 1946, led Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, the new Army Chief, to order a review of the McNarney Directive. General Spaatz again recommended assigning all missile development to central AAF control. He argued that missiles required autopilots, remote control devices, and airfoils-all items developed and procured by the AAF. Moreover, continuing War Department disagreement in the missile field might result in an uncontested victory for the Navy. Ordnance, however, adamantly refused to relinquish its interest in developing missiles maneuverable in flight. The AAF then offered to prepare military characteristics for all air-Iaunched missiles and for those surface-Iaunched missiles employed in strategic and air defense missions, whereas the AGF would prepare statements for all close support and unguided air defense missiles. Therefore, the AAF would develop all missiles controllable in flight and the ASF would govern in the area of non-controllable missiles. Under the proposal, each organization would use the technical capabilities of the other. Both would encourage joint contracting and submit missile projects to the New Development Division in order to avert duplication. The AAF planned to Gen. Joseph T. McNarney. In October 1944, as Army Deputy Chief of Staff, he assigned the AAF responsibility for developing all air-Iaunched missiles and certain surface-Iaunched missiles. 20 PIWTLESS AIRCRAFT Gen. Henry H. (Hap) Arnold, Commanding General of the Army Air Forces. demonstrate its abilities through a 1,OOO-mile remote-controlled flight of a B-29 aircraft nicknamed Project Banshee.2s General Spaatz.submitted the AAF proposal in April 1946, but because of the pending War Department reorganization, it was delayed for some time before being rejected. Maj. Gen. Henry S. Aurand, an Ordnance officer who was named the Army General Staff's Director of Research and Development in the summer of 1946, expressed the view that missiles were basically rockets. He reasoned that, since the AAF was concerned with pilots, it had a dubious claim on the missile field.26 Although AAF leaders acknowledged the primacy of flying, they also recognized that "the 1ong-range future of the AAF lies in the field of guided missiles." 27 The AAF-Navy rivalry had its roots outside the missile arena in long-standing controversies concerning roles and missions. The Navy's air arm, for example, served as a major irritant, contradicting the AAF's doctrine of the indivisibility of air power. The AAF also considered the Navy a serious threat to its air defense and strategic bombardment missions.

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